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THE GENESIS OF THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.

II. PSYCHOLOGICAL.

EVEN if chronology be not, as it has been called, the eyes of history, the date 1781 is at least a focal point, not only in the life of Kant, but in the development of modern philosophy. It was in that year, when its author was three score save three, that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was first given to the world. The earliest systematic presentation, it was not, however, the first expression of the new philosophic thought that had taken possession of the mind of Kant. As early as 1770, on his promotion to the full professorship of logic and metaphysics, he propounded the germinal doctrine in an inaugural dissertation entitled *De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis*. This work is the outcome of a discovery, revolutionizing his previous metaphysics, made by Kant, as his correspondence and annotations recently brought to light¹ assure us, in the year 1769. Although it took many years to work out the results of the new departure, and the public did not hear of it till 1781, yet the crucial point in the philosophical development of Kant is marked by the date of that important discovery. It divides his life into two distinct periods—a critical period, beginning with 1769, and a pre-critical, ending with the same date. In a psychological genesis of the critical philosophy, while its elaboration in the later of these periods should not be overlooked, the most important and at the same time the most difficult task is to follow the process of its origination in the earlier period. The essential question here is: How did Kant reach the standpoint of criticism?

The passages already cited to illustrate the nature and mutual relations of dogmatism, scepticism, and criticism, show that Kant

¹ These manuscript notes have been published under the able editorship of Professor Benno Erdmann with the title *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie*. The year 1769 is given as the date of the critical crisis in *Ref.* 4, Bd. II, 4 of that series. In the well known letter to Lambert, dated 2d. Sept. 1770, Kant says (VIII, 662) he reached the new conception "about a year ago."

combined them as successive stages in the development of reason. Their logical relation coincides with the psychological sequence. What is first, middle, and last in abstract thought turns up in the same order, successively, as creed of the individual thinker. As generalized in Hegel's history of philosophy, this theory of the correspondence of thought-dependence and time-sequence is open to the gravest doubt. But in its particular application to Kant it presents no difficulty, since it can be shown historically that his successive acceptance of the three modes of thought followed the order of their logical consecution. Very little, however, is gained with this result. For in mental development one stage is not wholly left behind when another is reached. To represent Kant as passing successively through the standpoints of Wolff, Locke, and Hume, as though finishing one before beginning another, and finally escaping from all to the isolated heights of criticism, is a method of characterization as valueless in itself as it is false to the conditions of spiritual growth. In mind, as in nature, the principle of conservation goes hand in hand with the principle of change. The sequents are always accumulated. And, for a right understanding of the critical philosophy, the order of their coming is of consequence only as it furnishes data for determining their relative influence as moments in the production of a new movement of thought. This estimate cannot be made independently of the mental history of the individual. If we would rightly appreciate the system of Kant, we must, therefore, study chronologically his relations to dogmatism and scepticism, his early and implicit allegiance to the former, his temporary absorption in natural philosophy, his metaphysical questionings and anti-dogmatic solutions, his scepticism too bitterly disappointing for final rest, his reconquest of a large domain of rationalism, and his definitive modification of the old system he had never, at least as ideal, absolutely deserted by the incorporation of scepticism.

The pre-critical period of Kant's development falls into two divisions, which may be separated by the year 1760. In the later (1760-1769) his mind was in a sceptical ferment; in the earlier (1746-1760) it still reposed in the philosophy of Wolff as it had

been delivered by Schultz and Knutzen, though by 1755 there were clear signs of independent thought. In these earlier years, however, he was occupied mainly with physical science, for which his writings show him to have had a strong bent and a wonderful capacity. Besides his great work on physical astronomy and the mechanical essay already mentioned, he made investigations into the changes in the revolution of the earth about its own axis, the problematical decay of the earth, the nature of fire, the causes of earthquakes, the phenomena of the great earthquake at Lisbon, motion and rest, physical geography, and even the cause of the dampness of the Königsberg west winds. A follower and admirer of Newton, he demonstrated before Laplace the evolution of the cosmos; before Ritter he originated and fruitfully applied the conception of a scientific geography; before Darwin he was fascinated with the ideas of descent and inheritance, and even suspected accidental variations, though data were still wanting for turning the classification of species into a genealogical system. From such intense and varied occupation with the natural sciences it would be plausible, even in the absence of results far less brilliant than Kant achieved, to argue to their influence on his philosophy. But in this inference one weighty consideration is overlooked. During the entire period of earnest scientific activity Kant never made the problems of philosophy a matter of primary concern, save on the occasion of two inaugural dissertations. His speculative interest was still alive, and often sent a pulsation into the calm region of science, but as regards systematic expression it lay in abeyance. Science and philosophy, therefore, never got an opportunity to look each other in the face. And, even if they had, one cannot imagine what the system of Wolff would or could have taken from the natural philosophy of Newton. The subject-matter of each was not only unlike, but absolutely incapable of commingling with the other. Their methods, too, were different; though the thought of an inductive method of philosophy is not unintelligible, and at a later period, as we shall see, probably under Newtonian influence actually recommended itself to Kant. But this fact is no warrant for the assertion that Kant's intense occupation with Newton brought about his release from

the dogmas of the philosophy of Wolff, and that these ceased to influence him as early as 1756.¹ On the contrary, Kant's works show that he was an adherent, though now as ever not a slavish adherent of the traditional philosophy until some years later, when he effected its dissolution by a gradual independent criticism from within. That dissolving process began, it is true, with the inaugural dissertation of 1755, the *Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicæ nova dilucidatio*. But this work is little more than an independent formulation of the current rationalistic theory or knowledge, which, in fact, it defends against the attacks of Crusius. Difficulties of his own, Kant indeed raised; but as he had no solution for them, neither had he a sense of the far-reaching consequences which we, in the light of his later discoveries, are apt to read into them. Though criticising details, he still stood within the system of Leibnitz and Wolff. He shared their views of the nature and method of philosophical knowledge, and their obscurity too, in treating of the derivation of real truth from mere logical laws. But in formulating the theory he raised questions for the future. His substitution of *ratio determinans* for the principle of sufficient reason (*ratio sufficiens*) might be taken as merely a nominal change; but when the *ratio determinans* bifurcated into a *ratio essendi vel fiendi* on the one hand, and a *ratio cognoscendi* on the other, the rationalistic unity of thought and things was implicitly broken, though the innovator remained unconscious of the full effect of his revolutionary stroke. The stable equilibrium of his beliefs being gone, Kant could not but move on in response to the disturbing impulse. By slow but sure degrees, it carried him from the rationalism of Wolff to a scepticism akin to Hume's.

From this time on Kant devoted himself exclusively to the philosophical sciences. With metaphysics it was, as he said, his

¹ Riehl, *Philosophischer Kriticismus*, I, 237-8, cf. pp. 234-242. Riehl rightly calls attention to the influence of Newton, but certainly overestimates it when he says it was "not less than the influence of Hume" (p. 234), and "took Kant beyond the German conceptual philosophy," of which he was after 1756 "no longer an adherent" (240-1). Paulsen and Benno Erdmann both agree with the view presented in the text. Cf. *Reflexionen*, etc, Einl. xvi, and *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, pp. 28-36. Riehl's attempt to derive Kant's later pre-critical theory of space from Newton is far from conclusive.

fate to be deeply in love (*verliebt zu sein*). An intellectual Romeo, science was his Rosalind, philosophy his Juliet. And never, it may be added, was his passion greater than in those despairing days when, renouncing the traditions of his lineage, he boldly wooed her in the fortress of his ancestral enemies—the Capulets of empiricism.

The second stage in the pre-critical development of Kant was first announced in the publications of the years 1762 and 1763. These are, in the order of their composition:¹ *Demonstration of the False Subtlety of the four Syllogistic Figures*, *The only possible Ground of a Proof of the Existence of God*, *Investigation into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics*, *Attempt to Introduce the Conception of Negative Quantities into Philosophy*. These all deal, directly or indirectly, with the problem of knowledge, which is also the crucial theme of the ironical investigation of 1766 suggested by the necromancy of Swedenborg: *Dream of a Spiritualist illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics*. With these may be mentioned, not for its connection with the subject in hand, but as further proof of the astonishing productivity of Kant in these years, the *Observations on the Sentiment of the Sublime and Beautiful*, which was finished by the 8th of October, 1763, only four months after the essay on Negative Quantities.

The cardinal assumption of rationalism is, that for the apprehension of reality nothing is required beyond the analytic processes of logical thinking. This view, so foreign and almost

¹ The traditional dating of these works, which was followed by Kuno Fischer in the earlier editions of his *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie* (See III, 171–201, 2d edition), and has only been partially modified in the latest edition, was first shown by Cohen to be erroneous. Cf. *Die systematische Begriffe in Kants vorkritischen Schriften*, 15 ff. The most important change to be made is the bringing forward of *The only possible Ground* etc., from 1763 to the summer of 1762. With his usual sagacity Paulsen was the first to discuss the true date of this very significant production (*Entwicklungsgeschichte*, 69–72), although his proof was not absolutely conclusive until established by new evidence adduced by Benno Erdmann (*Kants Reflexionen* Einl., xvii–xx). The order of the works, as given in the text, has been made almost certain by Erdmann's investigations. That Thiele in the second volume (1887) of his *Die Philosophie I. Kants* should have put *The only possible Ground* etc., after the *Investigation into the Clearness* etc., cannot be justified, and suggests pragmatic reconstruction. See, however, Thiele II, 191 ff.

incomprehensible to us, is that in which Kant had been educated, and which hitherto he had in the main accepted. But in the works just mentioned we see him awakening to a clear consciousness of its falsity, which he demonstrates with a pitiless disregard for all the high interests the doctrine was intended to secure. Yet, though undermined as a system, rationalism continued to float before him as an ideal of philosophy. This disparity between the reach and the grasp of his thought engendered in him a bitterness of spirit, the pathos of which is unknown to the mere sceptic. Hence the still sad music which he that hath an ear may hear beneath the banter and persiflage of Swedenborg and metaphysics. But in the works of 1762-63, Kant is still calm, earnest, thorough, remorselessly dispassionate. Without indulging in Baconian denunciation of logic, he exposes the false subtlety which has made of the one pure and simple process of ratiocination four syllogistic figures. And after reducing all syllogisms to a single form, he resolves both the syllogism and the judgment into analytic determination of notions. There is, therefore, but one logical faculty; and its function is, not to add to our knowledge, but to unfold, to make clear and determinate what we already possess. In addition to this important result, the essay on the false subtlety of the four syllogistic figures closes with the recognition that human knowledge is full of indemonstrable propositions.¹ This discovery is not less fatal to rationalism than the other. Both are fully elucidated in the remaining works of this period.

The only possible Ground of a Proof of the Existence of God is, for Kant's own development, one of the most significant of these works. Of the two fundamental problems of metaphysics—existence and causation—it is our knowledge of existence, in a single but crucial instance, that is here subjected to critical examination. The proof of the Divine existence, which is the burden of the non-sceptical philosophy, formed the central topic of rationalism. It was the motive and inspiration of Kant's best thinking, and from its presence he never escaped, whether he consorted with Wolff, Newton, or Hume, or threaded alone the

¹ II, 55-68, especially 66-68.

mazes of critical metaphysics, ethics, and theology. In a literal sense he was a veritable 'Knight of the Holy Ghost.' But the weapons of his warfare were human and perishable. The cosmological argument which he went out of his way to insert in the *Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels*¹ and the ontological argument for which a place was naturally found in the *Nova dilucidatio*², are both rejected in *The only possible Ground* in favor of a new speculative proof which afterwards followed the fate of its predecessors to make way for the moral argument of the later critical treatises. The new proof is manifestly fallacious. Starting with the rationalistic notion of 'possibility,' it infers the Divine existence as its ground. In order that any thing may be possible, *i.e.*, thinkable, there must be an existence with the attributes of God. Negate the latter, and you negate the former. But this consequence is not disastrous beyond the pale of the school that juggled with 'possibility.' The conditions of our thought cannot in any case be taken as the conditions of reality. Kant had already attained this general point of view, and if his theological argumentation seems to ignore it, that is because it is not intended as a demonstration, but only as a recasting of the ontological proof in a form in which, *if at all*, it may hereafter be demonstrated. In the form hitherto prevalent, it implied that existence was a predicate of things, which Kant himself had formerly assumed. But the present treatise formally demonstrates "that existence is no predicate or determination of any thing." It is "the absolute position of a thing." And for Kant's own development this must without doubt be regarded as the chief result of the work. According to the rationalist, existence was proved by way of logical analysis, so that the denial of the Divine existence was a logical contradiction. But this thesis fell with Kant's proof that existence was different from any and every predicate of a thing.³

Mathematical demonstration was, as we have already seen, the ideal and pattern of rationalistic philosophy. Scarcely had Kant shown that a knowledge of reality could not be attained by a

¹ I, 215 ff, 315.

² I. 376-7.

³ II, 109-205, especially 115-117, 121-135, 158-180, 198-205.

new analysis of notions than he undertook, on the occasion of a prize question propounded by the Berlin Academy of Science, a formal and exhaustive differentiation of mathematics and philosophy. This is the subject of his *Investigation into the Clearness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics*, which must have been submitted to the Academy not later than April, 1763. In this essay, the leading moment is the discovery that, while the procedure of metaphysics is analytic, and its faculty understanding, the procedure of mathematics is synthetic and its faculty perception (*Anschauung*).¹ Mathematics sets out with definitions, philosophy goes in quest of them; mathematics deals with quantities which it constructs for perception, philosophy with notions which are given independently of any such norm. The objects of mathematics contain nothing but what the definition puts into them; the objects of philosophy are an algebraic x of which the definition is to be sought. Those are easy and simple; these difficult and complicated. It is the business of the philosopher to analyze and accurately determine notions which are given as confused. Quantities being already clear and certain, the mathematician combines and compares them, in order to see what may thence be inferred. In mathematics there are but few indecomposable notions and indemonstrable propositions; in philosophy they abound. It is the aim of metaphysics to discover and classify these ultimate grounds of our knowledge. Its true method is identical with that followed so successfully by Newton in the science of nature. "Metaphysics is, without doubt, the most difficult of all human sciences; but a science up to this time never once realized." Were the method, however, once established, by which the highest possible certainty in this kind of knowledge can be attained, metaphysics would no longer be the scene of ever-changing opinions and sects, but, following a sure procedure, it would acquire a settled and definitive shape and body like that achieved for physics by the method of Newton. For in itself metaphysical knowledge is capable of a certainty sufficient for

¹The distinction of methods is clear, fundamental, and reiterated; the distinction of faculties is incipient only, and space is most frequently spoken of as a notion (*Begriff*) and its relations are said to be determined by the understanding (*Verstand*). See Thiele, II, 85-88; Windelband II, 23-4; Riehl, I, 209, 214-216.

conviction, and more cannot be said of mathematics except that it is easier and more perceptible (*einer grösseren Anschauung theilhaftig*).¹

With this determination of the different methods of mathematics and metaphysics there is no incompatibility in Kant's *Attempt to Introduce the Conception of Negative Quantities into Philosophy*. Negation has played a prominent part in the development of speculation. Regarded by Heraclitus as not less real than being, it degenerated under modern rationalism into a sort of limbo for all things vain and imperfect, and was left to languish ingloriously until Hegel saw in it the generating impulse of a dialectic which could at once clear the thick deposits of thought and reveal the development of God, man, and nature. Through all its checkered history it has tended towards hypostatisation. From its indispensableness as a relation of thought, it has passed as a basis of things. And the opposition between forces in the real world came to be conceived under the relation of logical contradiction. This is the objective point of Kant's attack, but he approaches it through mathematics, which furnishes an unexpected weapon. According to logic it is impossible for a thing (*S*) to be at the same time both *P* and not-*P*, but, according to mathematics, it may be both $+P$ and $-P$, since zero is not an irrational determination. Thus, you cannot, without contradiction, predicate of a body motion and not-motion; but a body may be acted upon by two equal and opposite ($+$ and $-$) forces without any absurdity. Logical opposition, therefore, is one thing; real repugnancy quite another. And Kant calls attention to the fact that notions like love and hate, pleasure and pain, good and evil, truth and falsehood, which have generally passed as logical, are in fact real opposites. Not only in psychology, but also in cosmology, has the principle of negative quantities fruitful application. But its most important use is in metaphysics. For the real repugnancy of things is a causal relation. It implies that in virtue of something, something else is not. And this negative formula equally with the positive, where something is something else is, is the expression of a causal

¹ II, 283-309.

connection. To have shown the essential difference between real repugnancy and logical opposition is, therefore, to have shown that the causal relation cannot be apprehended by logical analysis and comparison of concepts. The laws of identity and contradiction give no clue to the real connection and repugnancy of things. Beyond this negative result, which is momentous for Kant's development, the present essay does not advance. But the result is, in the closing paragraphs of the essay, coupled with the still unsolved problem in words that remind us of Hume: "I understand very well how a consequence is entailed by a ground according to the rule of identity, namely, because on analysis of the notions it is found to be contained in it. . . . But how something flows from something else, not according to the rule of identity—this is a matter I would gladly have cleared up. . . . How shall I understand that *because something is something else is*. . . . The real ground is never a logical ground. . . . How through the motion of one body is the motion of another cancelled, since there is no logical contradiction between them. . . . Try whether real repugnancy can be explained, and it can be made clear how *because something is, something else is cancelled*, and whether you can say more than I have said, namely, this only, that it is not in virtue of the principle of contradiction. I have thought much on the nature of our knowledge in regard to our judgments of ground and consequences, and some time I will give in detail the result of these reflections."¹

At this date then Kant has discovered that the rationalistic interpretation of causation is no solution of the problem, which, on the other hand, he formulates in the very question of Hume. But the essay does not go beyond the statement of an unexplained difficulty. And save for its closing words, we should not know that Kant's own reflection had gone farther either. The general impression, which is scarcely altered by the obscure

¹ II, 71-106, especially 102-106. After the last quotation follows a very (perhaps purposely) obscure sentence, hinting at a solution of the problem, which Riehl (*Philos. Criticismus*, I, 224, 245-6, 256-7) holds to be an anticipation of the critical philosophy, and Paulsen (*Entwicklungsgeschichte*, 43-46) an anticipation of the pronounced empiricism of the closing section of the *Dreams of a Spiritualist*.

parting confession, is of one groping amid thick darkness without hope of dawn. This mood is accompanied by a gnawing distrust of rational theology—a scepticism which not only laments “man’s frail knowledge of the infinite godhead,” but seeks bold expression in the saying of Simonides: “The more I think of God, the less am I able to understand Him.”¹ In the prize essay, Kant had maintained that the first principles of theology and ethics were capable of the greatest philosophical evidence.² Their demonstration was to be effected by aid of unanalyzable notions (*unauflösbare Begriffe*) and indemonstrable propositions (*unerweisliche Sätze*) which, as a residuum of rationalism, still held a place in Kant’s philosophic thought and received repeated recognition in the prize essay. But the serviceableness of these ultimate terms was always clearer than their origin, extent, and relation to experience. Accordingly, in the essay on negative quantities, in which their function is superseded by a scepticism towards rational theology, they are kept in the background. Kant had at present no use for them except to put his religious and moral convictions upon a firm scientific basis. That this, however, was impossible is the result to which he advances still more fully in the next and last stage of the pre-critical period, when, under the influence of Rousseau (whose *Emile* appeared in 1762), and to some extent of Voltaire, he made a clear, and, for his own thought, final and irrevocable separation between metaphysical speculation and moral and religious convictions, for the support of which he had till now deemed it indispensable.

But if metaphysics did not fulfil this end, of what use was metaphysics? Assuredly its problems must be very different from what Kant had hitherto supposed. And for the next two or three years he dwells much on the method of metaphysics, which, in one of his *Reflexionen*, is called “the most important part” of the science. Possibly that was the subject of the work promised at the close of the Essay on Negative Quantities. Certainly, The Right Method of Metaphysics was the title of a work announced in 1765, which, however, “as the main result of all these

¹ II, 102.² II, 304-8

views," Kant determined to postpone for a little on account of the difficulty of finding examples *in concreto* of the right method, in opposition to the wrong of which illustrations abounded.¹ It was many years before this "tractate on method" appeared in the transformation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But the critical part of the Right Method of Metaphysics was fully delivered, we may reasonably conjecture, in the *Dreams of a Spiritualist illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics* in the year 1766. Here Swedenborg serves as a whipping post for the metaphysicians whom Kant scourges unmercifully. Knowledge of the supra-sensible is put on the same level as the arts of necromancy. In the one case it is a dream of sense, in the other a dream of reason; in both an illusion. But though Kant, in virtue of the divorce between the theoretical and practical elements of his thought, jibed at a metaphysical proof of those dear interests which his heart was still open to shelter, it required some effort to overcome the rationalizing aspirations of earlier years, and the struggle occasionally found vent in a bitterness of feeling, like the hatred of a deserted friend or the despair of a rejected lover.² Still the line between the sensible and the supra-sensible was once for all firmly drawn, and if we except the illusory inference first drawn from the discovery of the *Dissertation*, nevermore in Kant was theoretical reason allowed beyond the domain of possible experience. "When the fundamental relations are reached, the business of philosophy is at an end; and reason cannot tell us how anything can be a cause or exercise a force, so that we must simply accept these relations as facts of experience." If they are not derived from experience they are "quite arbitrary and can neither be proved nor disproved." Hence emerges a new conception of metaphysics. No longer a science of the supra-sensible, its aim will be to determine "whether our knowledge is adequate to the solution of certain problems, and what relation they have to the facts of experience on which all our judgments must at all times be based." In a word, "metaphysics is the doctrine of the

¹ Letter to Lambert, 31 December, 1765 (VIII, 655-6). For the remark on the importance of method, see *Reflexionen*, No. 183 (II, 55).

² See *Träume eines Geistessehers* II, Th., 2 Hptst. *ad fin* (II, 375) and letter to Mendelssohn, 8 April, 1766, (VIII, 672-6).

limits of human reason." This conclusion is only the counterpart of Kant's conviction that theoretical reason can furnish no foundation for morals and religion. And Kant expressly draws the limits so as to exclude all questions "whose data are found in another world than that in which we are sentient." Such problems must be banished to the "limbo of vanity." That done, "metaphysics will become what she is now far from being and what no one expects from her, the escort to wisdom." And the beginning of wisdom appears to be Voltaire's advice to honest Candide, with which at any rate Kant's work closes: "Let us look after our happiness, go into the garden and work."¹

This ends the history of Kant's philosophical development in the pre-critical period. Step by step we have watched his decline from a soaring rationalism that would explain everything, to the "lowly ground of experience and common sense," which he has come to regard as "our determined place from which we cannot budge without penalty."² This apostasy to the school of Wolff was, as we have seen, the result of a series of discoveries made in the years 1761-6. In brief, these were: (1) logical thought is analytic; (2) existence is no predicate of a thing; (3) causality is inexplicable to reason, and, if not illusory, must be accepted from experience; (4) the method of metaphysics is wholly unlike that of mathematics; (5) there is no knowledge of the supra-sensible, and metaphysics can survive only as a theory of the limits of human knowledge. *But these propositions, as they negate logical rationalism, constitute the essence of empiricism or mitigated scepticism, which had been formulated in Hume's "Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding."*³ And apart from its tones of deeper earnestness, Kant's scoffing attitude towards metaphysics in the satire on Swedenborg is precisely the attitude of Hume, whose parting injunction is, "Commit to the flames

¹ II, 375-381.

² II, 376.

³ These propositions are all found in the closing summary of Hume's *Enquiry*, Section XII, Part III, *ad fin.* The second, however, that regarding existence, is only implied; and for its explicit statement we must go to the *Treatise*, where it is reiterated (I, 370, 394, 396 note, Green & Grose's edition). The other propositions are, of course, not all of the same importance to Hume, who gives most attention to the third, on causality, though deeply interested too in the fifth, on the limits of knowledge.

. . . any volume of divinity or school metaphysics ; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." Both insist on the necessity of restricting metaphysics to the realm of experience. In words as memorable as Kant's, Hume says : " Those who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their researches ; because they reflect that, besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation, philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected. But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life, so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ, their narrow reach, and their inaccurate operations." And if Kant, following Voltaire, found, like the great author of *Faust*, a cure for universal doubt in the cultivation of the soil, Hume too had prescribed the same remedy in more general terms : " The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism*, or the excessive principles of scepticism, is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life." ¹

Our diagnosis of all the symptoms indicates a common disease. Was it a case of infection ? Was Kant's scepticism, in other words, borrowed from Hume ? Its derivation from that source has been inferred, not only from identity of doctrine, but also in consequence of Kant's own statement in the introduction to the *Prolegomena* in 1783. " The suggestion of David Hume," he there says, " was the very thing which many years ago first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." The determination of the date of this Humian influence, especially whether it was prior or subsequent to 1769, is not merely a question of curious scholarship, but is indispensable to the interpretation of the fundamental problem of the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. Increasing examples show that the rendering of that problem varies with the dating of the influence of Hume.²

¹ Hume's *Enquiry*, Section XII, Parts II-III.

² On this question of chronology there is a copious literature. In the excellent article by Benno Erdmann on *Kant und Hume um 1762* in the first and second numbers (October, 1887 ; January, 1888), of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* Hume's influence is placed as late as 1772. See his edition of Kant's *Prolegomena*, Einleitung lxxix ff, and his *Reflexionen Kants zur krit.*

One point may be disposed of in a few words. When Kant was awakened from his 'dogmatic slumber,' he tells us he was "far from following Hume in all his conclusions."¹ This could not have been in the period from 1762-6, when, as we have seen, he had reached the standpoint of Hume. It could not have been at an earlier date, for he was then under the influence of Wolff. It must, therefore, have taken place between 1766 and the publication of the *Critique*. But the rest of Kant's statement shows that the stimulus he received from Hume moved him to the construction of the *Critique*, which, he explicitly says, was "the carrying out of Hume's problem in its widest extent."² Kant's own statement, therefore, cannot be adduced in proof of a Humian influence prior to 1769, since, as we know, that is the date at which the critical method first dawned upon him.

Nor, in the second place, was Kant influenced at any time by Hume's *Treatise on Human Nature*. That work excited as little murmur on the Continent as in England, where, in the memorable words of Hume, "it fell still-born from the press." It was altogether ignored by Kant, whose conception of Hume's teachings, both in general and in its details, and whose silence on all topics peculiar to the *Treatise*, prove conclusively that the *Inquiry* was his sole source for the metaphysics of Hume.³ This fact is of so much significance for a correct estimate of the *Critique*, which English-speaking interpreters have strangely treated as a direct refutation of the sensational nescience of

Philos. Bd II, Einl., xlix ff. By most writers, however, the date has been carried back to 1762-3. Compare Kuno Fischer, *Gesch. d. neueren Philos.*, III, 178, 191, 254 (2d ed.); Cohen, *Die sys. Begriffe*, etc., 27; Riehl, *Philos. Kritikismus*, 223, 242; Vaihinger's *Commentar zu Kants Kr. d. r. V.* 48, 342-4. Paulsen was, I believe, the first to insist upon a later dating—the crucial year 1769 in his *Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisstheorie*, 47 ff, 86 ff, 126 ff. He is followed by Adamson, *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 203. Cantoni, *Emanuele Kant*, 97-121, has some sensible observations, but his dating is rather vague ("dal 1760 al 1770, e ancor in seguito"). Thiele, *Die Philosophie I. Kants*, II, 201-8, denies the influence of Hume in the pre-critical period.

¹ IV, 8 (8-9).

² IV, 8-9 (9-10).

³ See Kant's account of Hume's scepticism, already alluded to in the beginning of this article. Compare Paulsen, p. 48 note, and Baumann, *Raum, Zeit und Mathematik*, II, 482-3.

Hume's *Treatise*,¹ that it may be proper to supplement internal evidence by external. Not only was the importance of the *Treatise* unrecognized in Germany, but it was so little known that Hamann, who had formed a high opinion of Hume, does not appear to have been acquainted with it before 1781, the year of the publication of Kant's *Critique*. It was not translated till 1790, and then only in a mutilated form (by Jakob). And as Kant did not pay any attention to the translation, neither could he, if he would, have read the original, since it is now all but certain that *Kant did not know English*.²

Hume's *Essays*, on the other hand, were translated by Sulzer in the years 1754-1756. That Kant was acquainted with them by 1757 is probable from the report of Borowski, colored though it is by the revelations of the half century that elapsed before its writing.³ Hamann, at any rate, had begun to read the *Enquiry* in 1756; and we know that, if not before, at least on July 27, 1759, he wrote to Kant of the "Attic philosopher," Hume, who was "in spite of all his errors . . . as Saul among the prophets."⁴ Soon after, Kant's lectures and writings give evidence of converse with Hume. Herder, who was a student at Königsberg from 1762-4, "heard Kant's criticisms (*Urtheile*) of Leibnitz, Newton, Wolff, Crusius, Baumgarten, Helvetius, Hume, Rousseau, some of whom were then new authors."⁵ There is a quotation from Hume, on the talents of negroes, in Kant's *Observations on the Sentiment of the Sublime and Beautiful*, which was written in 1763.⁶ And in the announcement of his lectures for the winter of 1765-6 he mentions "the essays of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, which, though incomplete and deficient, have, nevertheless, gone farthest in the discovery of the first principles of morality."⁷

¹ E.g., Green, Caird, Adamson, Watson, Harris, Morris.

² See Benno Erdmann's article in *Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos.* Bd. I, Heft. I, 63-5, with notes.

³ *Darstellung d. Leb. u. Char. I. Kants*, 1804, p. 170.

⁴ Hamann, *Werke* (ed. Roth), I, 274, 442.

⁵ Herder, *Werke* (ed. Suphan) XVIII, 324 f (*Archiv*, p. 72).

⁶ II, 276-277; cf. Hume's essay "Of National Characters" (Green & Grose's edition III, 252 n).

⁷ II, 319.

In Kant's metaphysical works of this period, which deal, as we have seen, with problems characteristic of Hume's philosophy, there is no mention of Hume. This circumstance, taken in connection with the two last quotations, suggests that, in Kant's pre-critical period, Hume was prized only as an essayist and a moralist, and if Kant had read his metaphysical and theological writings it was at a time when his mind was not yet open to receive them. This inference is confirmed by an examination of Herder's student and other early essays, in which his master's ignorance of the vital problems of Hume's philosophy is reflected so clearly as to preclude further doubt.¹ It only remains to show that Kant's philosophical writings from 1762 to 1765 bear unmistakable signs of a development fulfilling itself in complete independence of Hume, though issuing in a doctrine similar, in many respects, to the 'mitigated scepticism' of the *Inquiry*.

This has, in fact, been pretty clearly exhibited in the account already given of Kant's works. This account presents an evolution of problems and solutions so natural that some hardihood is required to doubt they were self-originated. It is true the *terminus a quo* of Kant's pre-critical development is very unlike the *terminus ad quem*; but when we survey the intervening space we find a series of minute and gradual variations, naturally produced, whose accumulation is adequate to the development of the Wolfian type of philosophy into a new species as far removed from it as Kant's present standpoint, without the intervention of any foreign influence. Besides, all the circumstances, excepting only the coincidence of results with Hume's, point to an independent origin and development of Kant's thought. He might, indeed, have learned from Hume that the logical proposition was "nothing but a more imperfect definition;" but it is not conceivable this was ever read, or at least understood, by the author of the elaborate essay on syllogistic figures. It is, it is true, in the *Treatise* we read that "to reflect on any thing simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other," but this novel doctrine is echoed in the *Enquiry* when, *e.g.*, the non-exist-

¹ The examination has been made by Erdmann in his essay in the *Archiv*, pp. 69-76.

ence of "Caesar or the angel Gabriel" is said to be "perfectly conceivable" and "to imply no contradiction;" yet it was surely not derived from this source by Kant, who first enunciated that "existence was no predicate of a thing" in connection with the arguments for the existence of God that had been brought into prominence by Crusius and Newton. For the proposition is clearly felt to be new and paradoxical, and Kant proves it by the aid of notions inherited from rationalism. And he says explicitly that his observations were not suggested by Hume, but "the result of a long reflection."¹ In the same way his distinction between the methods of mathematics and philosophy bears the impress of original insight.

Indeed, Hume makes no such official examination of the subject. And his occasional utterances lack not only the exhaustive discrimination that marks Kant's treatment, but ignoring altogether the difference between analytic and synthetic procedure, fix upon demonstrability as the distinguishing characteristic of mathematical knowledge. "Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought" [demonstration, reason, *not* mere logical analysis]. And "the only objects . . . of demonstration are quantity and number, and all attempts to extend this more perfect species of knowledge beyond these bounds are mere sophistry and illusion." The extrusion of philosophy from that "perfect species of knowledge" to which rationalism had assigned it, is as complete in Hume as in Kant; but there can be no doubt of Kant's originality. His renunciation of metaphysics as a science of the supra-sensible world was a consequence of that complete breach with the rationalistic assumption of the identity of thought and things which was effected by his sceptical solution of the problem of causality. It is at this point especially that similarity of doctrine has been held to imply dependence of origin. But it is not enough to compare conclusions; we must also examine the starting points, the argumentation, the attendant circumstances. Now whatever Kant's inferences regarding causality may be, his point of departure was the distinction between the logical ground and the real ground. The relation of ground or condition to conse-

¹ II, 110. cf. 115 ff.

quence is clear in logic from the rule of identity. But when one thing in the actual world is called the ground of another, or is said to produce it, we are confronted by a relation which no logic can explain. The problem then is to understand : How, because something is, something else is? No answer is given in the work on negative quantities ; and in the satire on Swedenborg the relation is only vaguely declared to be taken from experience, if, indeed, it is not illusory. But all this is different from what we find in Hume. He sets out with the division of knowledge into relations of ideas and matters of fact. "Of the first kind are the sciences of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and, in short, every affirmation which is intuitively or demonstratively certain." Matters of fact have not the same certainty, since the contrary is always possible. Our knowledge of them is founded on the relation of cause and effect. And causes and effects are discoverable, not by reason, but by experience. We cannot give a satisfactory reason why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall or fire burn. Our belief in causation is the bastard progeny of custom and imagination. The very nerve of Hume's work is the definite solution of this problem, beyond the statement of which Kant only vaguely advances. Kant's inquiry can be explained as the continuation of an investigation, already begun, into the relation between the laws of thought and the actual world. The machinery and the motive power are peculiar to himself. The point of view from which he stumbles upon the Humian problem is wholly different from Hume's. Accordingly, though Kant often enough at this period alludes to other writers, there is in these discussions of causality no mention of Hume. On the contrary, he speaks with the air of a thinker who has discovered a new problem which he feels to be momentous, and for which he is restlessly, and at first vainly, casting about to find a solution. This attitude would be impossible for *der ehrliche Kant*, if Hume's problem, and solution too, were actually before him. The only satisfactory hypothesis is that, though Kant read Hume's *Essays* as soon as Sulzer's translation appeared, his mind was then too deeply imbued with the principles of Wolff to give free passage to a doctrine so contrary as the Humian theory of causation. We see,

not what is brought before us, but what we have the power to see. And Kant, in the matter of Hume's metaphysics, was not more obtuse than Sulzer and Mendelssohn. Six years later, after laborious reflection, he reached independently, by way of reaction against Wolff, a standpoint similar to Hume's; but Hume had meantime faded into the background of his view, and the eye now capable of seeing him was directed to other objects from which came no hint that the problem of causation was not a brand-new discovery.¹

For the rest, there is great danger of exaggerating Kant's affinity to Hume in the period from 1762 to 1766. The general accord on certain fundamental points is so striking that differences are apt to be ignored, even when they go beyond details. The human mind, as Bacon puts it, is prone to overlook negative instances. And the most brilliant historian of modern philosophy exemplifies this *idolon tribus* in describing Kant at this time as a sceptic "in the most precise agreement with Hume."² Agreement there certainly was, agreement, too, on fundamental points, as has already been specified. Kant had come to see with Hume that matters of fact and existence cannot be made out by pure reason, independently of experience. He had shown that the notion of possibility did not imply actuality, or, in general, that existence was unapproachable by way of logical thought. And from his proof of the disparity of logical and causal connexion, it followed that knowledge of matters of fact, which rests on the relation of cause and effect, cannot be furnished by pure reason. So that the result of the works of that period, namely, that no knowledge is derived from pure reason, is in general accord with the teaching of Hume. But here, as always, difference peers through identity. The doctrine held in common has peculiar shadings for each, as has been shown in the crucial instance of causality. In general, it will be found that Kant's results are mere negations. Hume, in his own way, is constructive, though

¹ See Erdmann in *Archiv*, Bd. I, Heft 2, 216-230, and Paulsen's *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, 49 ff. The quotations from Hume in this paragraph are taken from the *Enquiry*, Sect. IV, Pt. I and Sect. XII, Pt. III, except the quotation from the *Treatise*, for which see Green & Grose's edition, I, 370.

² Kuno Fischer's *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, III, 254.

his material is not of a very positive kind. Kant, on the other hand, is the destructive critic of logical rationalism. He denies the fundamental propositions of the Wolffian philosophy. But apart from these variations in a common type of doctrine, there is a wide divergence in the treatment of outlying questions by Hume and by Kant. There Kant unconsciously leans on the very support his best efforts have been given to undermine. And what is more, the circle of Kant's thought is larger than that of Hume's, which, therefore, it includes, but with which it is not coincident. Logical rationalism, or that rationalism which explained the laws of the real world as mere logical principles, he has parted with forever. But he is not, therefore, an empiricist. Though not prominent in his works—for they record his revolt against Wolff and inclination to empiricism—a residual element of rationalism is clearly discernible in Kant's present mode of thought. And the channels of expression, which have hitherto been swept by a wild torrent of scepticism, will soon be held by this early and abiding, though long dormant force, which nothing could permanently suppress, and which special circumstances were about to stimulate. Up to this time it has been to Kant himself an unconscious or disregarded possession. But there is good evidence of its existence.

Thus in the *Only possible Ground of a Proof of the Existence of God*, which makes a radical break with the old metaphysics, Kant is still dominated by its conception of the nature of existence. He cannot rid himself of the view that things are existent notions.¹ Take away this mysterious actualization of the notion into the thing and the two are identical. Without change of its content, the logos becomes flesh. But if the essences of things are the notions we think, the business of metaphysics will be the discovery and analysis of these notions. This second element of rationalism is, in the *Dreams of a Spiritualist illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics*, overlaid by a strongly empirical view of the origin and limitation of knowledge; but that work, from the peculiarity of its subject, gives necessarily only a one-sided view of Kant's standpoint in 1766. In the earlier prize essay, how-

¹ See II, 114-125. cf. Paulsen, 83.

ever, the search for ultimate notions and principles is clearly prescribed as the aim of metaphysics, and the method there and elsewhere recommended is the Newtonian. An admirable example of such metaphysical work is presented in Lambert's letter to Kant of November 13, 1765.¹ Lambert conceives of knowledge as a compound made up of ultimate notions as form, and of the deliverances of experience as matter. He would collect the ultimate notions by aid of a lexicon, and from them, by a kind of mathematical *ars combinatoria*, deduce the more complex. In reply Kant tells of a new method he has discovered, to which we must again advert. Meantime, it is to be noticed that Kant says nothing about ultimate notions,² a point on which he would scarcely have been silent if he had come to sensualize them, as the work on Swedenborg has been taken to imply.³ And in the work on *Negative Quantities* which has been specially appealed to in support of Humian influence, Kant gives expression to his new empirical theory of notions in truly rationalistic language. "All kinds of notions," it is there stated, "must rest upon the inner activity of the mind for their foundation. External things may, of course, contain the condition under which they appear in this or that form, but not the power actually to bring them forth. The soul's power of thought is the real ground of them all."⁴ This old leaven of rationalism comes out very unexpectedly in the prize essay on the *Principles of Natural Theology and Ethics*. The essential distinction which Kant, in opposition to Wolff, there makes between the synthetic procedure of mathematics and the analytical procedure of metaphysics, is assumed to be accidental and transient in the remark: "The time is still far distant for metaphysics to proceed synthetically."⁵ The inconsistency of the observation with the whole tenor of the work, makes it all the more valuable as a piece of unconscious testimony. But there is a deliberate assertion of Kant's that settles

¹ Kant's *Werke* VIII, 651-4. For Kant's reply, see 654-6.

² Windelband has fallen into the curious mistake of attributing Lambert's views to Kant. *Gesch. der neu. Philos.* II, 29-30.

³ This seems to be Paulsen's meaning, *Entwicklungsgeschichte*, 93.

⁴ II, 101.

⁵ II, 298.

once for all the limits of his relationship to Hume and deviation from Wolff. In his manuscript annotations and intercalations to Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* he says in regard to his works of this period: "In some points I thought I might contribute something to the common treasure; in others I found something to improve, yet always with the intention of extending thereby dogmatic knowledge (*Einsichten*). For the utterly despairing scepticism (*der so dreist hingesagte zweifel*) seemed to me to savor so much of ignorance with the tone of reason that I gave no hearing to it . . . I still hoped (*glaubte*) to find the method of extending dogmatical knowledge through pure reason."¹

From rationalism, then, Kant never wholly escaped. In the present empirical, as in the later critical direction of his thought, it remained his ideal of philosophy, though the realization was never again so complete as it had been for him in his earliest dogmatic phase. By 1766, in fact, the pillars of this edifice are gone, and Kant seems to lie exhausted on the 'lowly ground of experience.' But the old model still haunts him. And the hope of "extending knowledge through pure reason" is not extinct. This latent ideal or aspiration, which may have been strengthened by Leibnitz's *Nouveaux essais*, first published in 1765,² is a standing protest against the empirical outcome of his successive works. He cannot rest in what he has established. His views

¹ *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie*, II, 4, with Benno Erdmann's Introduction, xxiii. This important confession of Kant's is overlooked by G. Heymans in his valuable article on the "So-called Empirical Period of Kant" in the July (1889) number of the *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* (572-591). But Heymans, by a reëxamination of Kant's works corroborates the position of the text, showing that between 1755 and 1770 there was no essential revolution of Kant's thought, but only an orderly progressive development from logical and absolute rationalism to epistemological and relative rationalism. In this form it was crystallized in the *Critique*, where, however, Kant's present realistic rationalism is superseded by an idealistic or phenomenalist rationalism.

² As we do not know that Kant ever read Leibnitz's *opus posthumum*, which appeared when his revolt against dogmatism was at its height, Windelband *Gesch. d. neueren Philos.* II, 30 ff) und Vaihinger (*Commentar*, I, 48) are scarcely justified in making it the moving impulse to the critical system of Kant. This latter originated in 1769 with the discovery of the fundamental distinction between sense and understanding, which Leibnitz followed his school in differentiating only by their degrees of clearness or obscurity. This essential contrast between Kant and Leibnitz cannot be effaced by the obvious agreement in their treatment of the *a priori*.

are as changeable as they are unsettled. Unable to hold to rationalism, unwilling to accept empiricism, there is no relief for the contradictions of his thought except in a method which shall transcend both. And in a letter to Lambert (Dec. 31, 1765), from which we have already quoted, he holds out this hope of delivery, in a passage of great biographical value: "I have," he says, "for several years past turned my philosophical reflections in every conceivable manner; and after so many changes (*Umkip-pungen*), in which I always sought the sources of error or insight into the manner of procedure, I have at last succeeded in discovering the method which must be observed by those who wish to escape that illusion of knowledge which is forever giving to unsolved problems the appearance of being solved, and which is also the source of the baneful divisions of so-called philosophers." It is this method which saves metaphysics, objectively considered, from the hate and antipathy with which, in the well known letter to Mendelssohn (8 April, 1766), he visits the metaphysics of the schools. "I am so far," he then says, "from holding metaphysics in itself of little or no account that I am convinced, especially since some time ago, when I think I saw into its nature and peculiar place in human knowledge, that upon it depends nothing less than the true and permanent welfare of the human race."¹

What is the new method here so hopefully announced? The notes of time in the letters to Lambert and Mendelssohn ('for several years,' 'result of a long reflection,' etc.) as well as in the manuscript reflections² show that for its genesis we must look at least as early as the beginning of the sceptical period, that is, 1762. But the method is really of still earlier date. For it is only the obverse of that mediating method which, expressing an original tendency of Kant's mind, he practised, as we have seen, throughout the whole dogmatic period prior to 1762. There the procedure was to find identity amid differences; here it is to de-

¹ For these letters see VIII, 655, 673. Paulsen's interpretation of the new method as merely a further growth in empiricism (*Entwicklungsgeschichte*, p. 95) is disproved by Kant's *Reflexionen*. (See next note.)

² Kant's 'Reflections' on his own development at this time are contained in Nos. 2-7 of *Kants Reflexionen zur kritischen Philosophie*, II, 3-5.

velop differences out of identity. The one process is complementary to the other, and both must somehow be combined. But up to this time Kant holds them successively and in isolation. In the dogmatic period he was concerned to show that reason, even in the person of different thinkers, was at one with itself. At the close of the sceptical period he is convinced that reason is self-contradictory. Could the causes of this immanent dialectic be discovered, however, it might be as easy to mediate between contradictories as it was in the dogmatic period.

The sceptical method is not essentially different from the mediating method, only that a more fundamental problem is to be solved, and emphasis is laid, not upon the harmony to be effected by the solution, but upon the antinomies to be overcome in the problem. Meantime, however, Kant has no inkling of the solution, which first dawned upon him in 1769. But in the years just before, he is tireless in his demonstrations of the contradictoriness of reason. This is the source of the discords in philosophy, of which in the letter to Lambert he says he has found the explanation. This is the "important insight" mentioned to Mendelssohn, in virtue of which Kant says regarding metaphysical knowledge: "I find nothing more advisable than to strip off its dogmatic clothes and treat its pretences sceptically, which has certainly only a negative use, but prepares for a positive." The gradual progress of Kant in the use of this method, as well as the gain it brought him, is recorded in the manuscript 'Reflections.' There we are told: "Whoever is really earnest in seeking the truth will not spare even his own results, although they may seem to promise him desert in the science concerned. He must submit what he has learned or thought entirely to criticism. It was a long time till in this way I found the whole dogmatic theory dialectical. . . . I strove earnestly to prove propositions and their contradictories, not for the sake of establishing scepticism, but to discover the seat of that illusion of the understanding the existence of which I had come to suspect. The year '69 gave me great light. . . . We must consider propositions in all kinds of connections, and even when they do not seem to need a special proof we must try to assume the contra-

dictories, and so protract our examination till the truth is seen on every side.”¹ Nothing could be more conclusive than this testimony to the influence of the antinomies upon the development of Kant’s philosophical thought. His growing insight into the dialectic of reason may be dimly discerned through the works of the sceptical period, and it is especially discernible in the *Dreams of a Spiritualist illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysics*, where, not only scattered remarks, but the plan and structure of the whole, clearly betray the spirit of the antinomist. Not that the particular antinomies afterwards described in the *Critique of Pure Reason* were now clearly before Kant’s mind. What he has discovered is the innate contradictoriness of reason that made these or others possible. In a letter to Garve, thirty years later, Kant loses sight of this difference ; but, in spite of failing faculties, he is still clear in his statement of the influence upon his own philosophical development of that long-past discovery of the dialectical character, or contradictoriness of reason. “The antinomy of pure reason—the world has a beginning, it has no beginning ; and so on to the fourth, man is free, man is not free but necessitated ; it was this,” writes Kant in 1798, “which first woke me from my dogmatic slumbers and forced me to a critique of reason itself in order to take away the reproach of the apparent contradiction of reason with itself.”²

Here, then, we have reiterated the conditions for the great *Umkippung* or transformation in Kant’s mode of thought in the year 1769. In the so-called sceptical period, rationalism was still his ideal ; but he is equally removed both from Hume and from Wolff by his dialectical method—his plan of proving contradictory propositions for the sake of discovering that illusion of the understanding which stood in the way of mediating between them. What that illusion was by the discovery of which Kant in 1769 made a beginning of critical philosophy, will in due time appear. Meanwhile it may not be amiss to note how his prior experience with the antinomies is in the treatises of the critical period generalized into a necessary propædæutic to sound philosophy. This is,

¹ See preceding note.

² Quoted by Erdmann in *Kant’s Reflexionen*, xxxvi.

as it were, the only way into the true fold. The thieves and robbers who would enter by some other way assume, according to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, "a dogmatic obstinacy and take their stand on certain assertions, without granting a hearing and doing justice to the arguments of the opponent." The only alternative is to "abandon one's self to sceptical despair." "In both cases a death-blow is dealt to sound philosophy, although in the latter we might speak of the euthanasia of pure reason."¹ From such an issue nothing can save us but the dialectical or sceptical method already described. "I therefore expect the critical reader," says Kant in the *Prolegomena*, "to make this antinomy his chief study, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions, and to force it to self-examination. . . . As soon as the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to recur to the proof of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feel himself constrained to investigate the first foundation of all the cognition of pure reason with me more thoroughly."² And, again, speaking of the antinomy, Kant says more emphatically: "This product of pure reason in its transcendent use is its most remarkable phenomenon, and the most powerful of all means of rousing philosophy from its dogmatic slumber, and of exciting it to undertake the arduous task of the critique of reason itself."³

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¹ III, 293 (352).

² IV, 88-9 Anm. (135-6 n), See Riehl's *Kriticismus*, I, 273-4.

³ IV, 86 (131). For the same sentiment with recurrence of the same imagery ('slumbering reason,' 'sweet dogmatic dreams'), see *Ueber die Fortschritte der Metaphysik* VIII, 580, and *K. d. r. V.*, III, 503 (649).